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AN INCLUSIVE ENERGY TRANSITION: 
EXPANDING LOW-INCOME ACCESS TO CLEAN ENERGY 
PROGRAMS 
Melissa Powers∗ 
An array of new state policies and declining costs for clean 
energy technologies have opened electricity markets to many new 
participants, including electric utilities’ own customers. Most low-
income customers, however, lack the resources to access these 
markets. Indeed, low-income customers already face 
disproportionately high energy and transportation burdens. 
Regulators and utilities have expressed concerns that these 
burdens will only increase due to the loss of cross-subsidies 
provided through traditional electricity rate structures. Rather 
than develop effective strategies to protect low-income ratepayers 
and facilitate their participation in clean energy markets, several 
states have either enacted reactionary policies that disincentive all 
customer classes from participating or pursue limited programs, 
such as community solar programs, that will provide few benefits 
to low-income households. This paper argues that states should 
develop and fund comprehensive programs to ensure that low-
income households can participate in and benefit from the clean 
energy transition. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States energy system is in the midst of profound 
change. Renewable energy deployment has grown at an 
unprecedented rate, and innovations in metering, storage, and 
electric vehicle technology have spurred visions of a future energy 
system without fossil fuels.1 Although the United States trails 
many other national governments in developing a forward-looking 
energy policy2—and will likely fall much further behind under the 
                                                
 1 See, e.g., Mark Z. Jacobson et al., 100% Clean and Renewable Wind, Water, 
and Sunlight (WWS) All-Sector Energy Roadmaps for the 50 United States, 8 
ENERGY & ENVTL. SCI. 2093 (2015), 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/Articles/I/USStatesWWS.pdf 
(describing how the United States could obtain all of its energy needs from 
wind, solar, and hydroelectric sources by 2050 using existing technologies). 
 2 Compare, e.g., THE DANISH GOVERNMENT, OUR FUTURE ENERGY 3 (2011), 
https://stateofgreen.com/files/download/387 (setting a goal for Denmark to 
obtain 100 percent of all energy supplies from renewable resources by 2015), 
and Chloe Farand, Sweden Pledges to Cut All Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 
2045, THE INDEP. (Feb. 4, 2017, 1:50 PM), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/sweden-pledges-greenhouse-gas-
emissions-zero-2045-paris-agreement-a7561111.html (setting a similar carbon-
free energy coal), with THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, NATIONALLY 
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Trump Administration 3 —an increasing number of states have 
undertaken or explored bold initiatives to rapidly expand their 
carbon-free energy systems.4 In Massachusetts, for example, the 
2017 legislative docket included a proposed bill to transition the 
state’s electricity and heating systems away from fossil resources 
                                                                                                         
DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION (2016), 
http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/United%20States%20o
f%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf 
(establishing an economy-wide target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions 
by twenty-six to twenty-eight percent below its 2005 level in 2025, but not 
setting an express national renewable energy goal). 
 3  See, e.g., An America First Energy Plan, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-energy (last visited Apr. 17, 2017) 
(stating the Trump Administration will support shale oil, natural gas, and coal, 
and making no mention of renewable resources or climate change); Earl J. 
Ritchie, How Bad Will Donald Trump Be for Renewable Energy?, FORBES (Dec. 
1, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2016/12/01/how-bad-will-
donald-trump-be-for-renewable-energy/2/#74a0adb52b6e (projecting that the 
Trump Administration will enact policies favoring the oil industry and abandon 
the Clean Power Plan, thereby slowing the growth of renewables). But see 
Phuong Le, Washington Governor: Trump ‘Foolishness’ Won’t Affect Plans, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 26, 2017), reprinted in Phuong Le, Washington 
Governor: Trump ‘Foolishness’ Won’t Affect Plans, SFGATE (Jan. 26, 2017), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/26/washington-governor-says-
state-wont-be-deterred-on/ (“Washington Gov. Jay Inslee said Thursday the 
state will move forward with efforts to promote clean energy and tackle climate 
change despite ‘foolishness’ from President Donald Trump.”); Ken Silverstein, 
California Undercuts Trump’s Inauguration With Aggressive Carbon Reduction 
Plan, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2017), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2017/01/21/california-undercuts-
trumps-debut-with-aggressive-carbon-cutting-plan/#7fcf54ed422b (“By 2050, 
California hopes to have cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 80%.”). 
 4  For example, several states have increased their renewable portfolio 
standards to require at least fifty percent of their electricity to come from 
renewable resources. See, e.g., Jocelyn Durkay, State Renewable Portfolio 
Standards and Goals, NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 28, 
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx; 
see also Robert Walton, New Mexico Lawmakers Propose Expanding RPS to 
80% by 2040, UTIL. DIVE (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/new-
mexico-lawmakers-propose-expanding-rps-to-80-by-2040/435425/ (describing 
state renewable portfolio standard increases). In addition, New York has 
undertaken an effort to restructure its electricity system to accommodate 
substantial increases in distributed energy resources. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. 
SERV., REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION, No. 14-M-0101, at 51–52 (2014). 
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and to halve the use of fossil fuels in the transportation system by 
2050.5 Hawaii has led the nation in committing itself to a fossil-
free electricity system by 2045,6 and several other states have 
enacted renewable portfolio standards that will increase their share 
of renewable power to at least fifty percent by the middle of the 
century, if not sooner.7 For a country in which coal-fired power 
provided half of the nation’s electricity only a decade ago,8 the 
ascendancy of renewable resources has been astounding. 
The transition to renewable resources is also creating novel 
economic opportunities for new participants in the energy market.9 
While the historic model of electricity production and regulation in 
the United States excluded all but a handful of designated 
monopoly providers from profiting in the electricity sector, 10 
thousands of companies and individuals now sell renewable 
                                                
 5 Robert Walton, Massachusetts Lawmakers Float Aggressive Bill Mandating 
100% Renewables by 2035, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 24, 2017), 
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/massachusetts-lawmakers-float-aggressive-
bill-mandating-100-renewables-by/434612/. 
 6 See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Ige Signs Bill Setting 
100 Percent Renewable Energy Goal in Power Sector (June 8, 2015), 
http://governor.hawaii.gov/newsroom/press-release-governor-ige-signs-bill-
setting-100-percent-renewable-energy-goal-in-power-sector; see also H.B. 623, 
28th Leg. (Haw. 2015) (requiring an increase in renewable portfolio standards to 
twenty-five percent by December 31, 2020, and 100 percent by December 31, 
2040 and “[r]equir[ing] the Public Utilities Commission to include the impact of 
renewable portfolio standards, if any, on the energy prices offered by renewable 
energy developers and the cost of fossil fuel volatility in its renewable portfolio 
standards study and report to the Legislature.”). 
 7 See Walton, supra note 5 (describing New Mexico’s proposal of eighty 
percent renewable energy by 2040 fitting within Hawaii’s target of 100 percent 
renewable energy by 2045 and California’s target of fifty percent renewable 
energy by 2030). 
 8 Bruce Lieberman, Natural Gas and Wind are Supplanting Coal, YALE 
CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (Jan. 1, 2017), 
http://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2017/01/natural-gas-and-wind-are-
supplanting-coal/. 
 9 See WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY: ATTRACTING 
INVESTMENT TO BUILD TOMORROW’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR 23 (2015). 
 10 William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. 
REV. 1614, 1629–31 (2014). 
544 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 1 
electricity and other electricity services.11 Utilities’ own customers 
have begun to play a larger role as providers of electricity 
services. 12  State net metering laws and federal and state tax 
incentives have played critical roles in incentivizing these new 
participants to join the electricity market.13 Advanced metering and 
communication technologies have also enabled utility customers to 
earn revenue through demand response programs, which pay 
customers for reducing their energy usage. 14  Electric vehicle 
technology could create even more economic opportunities for 
utility customers, who could receive payments for allowing their 
car batteries to provide ancillary services to the grid.15 As laws and 
technologies have advanced, an increasing number of utility 
customers have begun to view the electricity system as a source of 
revenue, rather than a mere source of essential services.16 
Many low-income electricity customers, however, have few 
viable opportunities to participate in these new electricity markets 
or to otherwise benefit financially from the clean energy 
transition.17 To get access to the emerging “prosumer” energy 
markets, utility customers must have the resources to invest in the 
metering, storage, renewable generation, or demand response 
                                                
 11 See Elizabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean a 
Death Spiral for Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1, 4 (2014) (noting that 
growth in solar development was enabled by private leasing models, rather than 
utility deployment). 
 12 Boyd, supra note 10, at 1677–78. 
 13 Melissa Powers, Small is (Still) Beautiful: Designing U.S. Energy Policies 
to Increase Localized Renewable Energy Generation, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 595 
(2012); Inara Scott, Incentive Regulation, New Business Models, and the 
Transformation of the Electric Power Industry, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 
319, 354–55 (2016). 
 14 Sharon B. Jacobs, Bypassing Federalism and the Administrative Law of 
Negawatts, 100 IOWA L. REV. 885, 896–900 (2015) [hereinafter Jacobs, 
Bypassing Federalism]. 
 15 See Brian Lamble, Of Nesting Dolls and Trojan Horses: A Survey of Legal 
and Policy Issues Attendant to Vehicle-to-Grid Battery Electric Vehicles, 86 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 193 (2011). 
 16 See Boyd, supra note 10, at 1677–80 (discussing customers’ interests in 
realizing the benefits of disruptive technologies). 
 17 See Adrienne L. Thompson, Protecting Low-Income Ratepayers as the 
Electricity System Evolves, 37 ENERGY L.J. 265, 267–68, 281 (2016). 
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technologies that enable utility customers to serve as producers.18 
Many low-income customers lack access to the necessary capital 
or to the resources to procure, install, and deploy innovative energy 
technology.19 Indeed, many low-income households already face 
disproportionate energy and transportation burdens, and it is highly 
unlikely that they will have access to the resources necessary to 
enable them to build rooftop solar, buy electric vehicles, or install 
smart meters.20 Without access to capital and services that could 
enable streamlined installation of clean and smart energy facilities, 
low-income customers will continue to be excluded from the 
transitioning energy market.21 
Utilities have argued that emerging energy markets tend to 
provide disproportionate direct benefits to middle- and upper-
income consumers.22 Some states have responded with thoughtful 
programs to ensure access that is more inclusive. 23  Other 
jurisdictions, however, have either embraced limited solutions, 
such as community solar,24 which will likely not broadly expand 
low-income participation in the clean energy economy, 25  or 
                                                
 18 INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, SHARED RENEWABLE ENERGY 
FOR LOW- TO MODERATE-INCOME CONSUMERS: POLICY GUIDELINES AND 
MODEL PROVISIONS 11–12 (2016). 
 19 Thompson, supra note 17, at 292. 
 20 Id. at 267–68, 281. 
 21 INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 18 at 11–16. 
 22 Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. 
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115, 135–38 (2014-2015). 
 23 Deborah Behles, From Dirty to Green: Increasing Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy in Environmental Justice Communities, 58 VILL. L. REV. 25, 
31–33 (2013) (describing several programs in California, in particular, while 
noting that limited funding undermines several state programs). See also 
INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 18 at 8–9, 13, 18, 20, 
22–24 (discussing programs in Colorado, California, and New York). 
 24 Community solar refers to a project through which multiple community 
members receive electricity or financial benefits. DAVID FELDMAN ET AL., 
NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., SHARED SOLAR: CURRENT LANDSCAPE, 
MARKET POTENTIAL, AND THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION 3 
(2015), www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/63892.pdf. In most cases, beneficiaries of 
community solar buy “shares” of the solar project in exchange for receiving the 
benefits. Id. at 8, 18, and 27 (discussing models of financing and participation). 
 25 See infra notes 106–110 and accompanying text. Although community solar 
can provide opportunities for low-income households to participate in and 
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adopted reactionary policies that tend to stifle all consumer 
participation. For example, regulators have suspended net metering 
programs, partly out of fear that net metering may unfairly impact 
low-income ratepayers, although the economic impacts of net 
metering are contested. 26 While net metering could shift costs 
towards low-income ratepayers, or at least interfere with the cross-
subsidies provided in most utility rate structures, if net metering 
programs were  more expansive 27  evidence suggests that net 
metering could provide many benefits—in the form of pollution 
                                                                                                         
receive benefits from solar power, many low-income ratepayers lack the 
resources to buy shares of a community solar array. While states may require 
community solar developers to obtain a minimum amount of participation from 
low-income households, both the economic and the logistical hurdles associated 
with recruiting participants and developing the solar arrays have impeded low-
income households’ participation in community solar projects. See LOTUS 
ENGINEERING & SUSTAINABILITY, LLC, ANALYSIS OF THE FULFILLMENT OF THE 
LOW-INCOME CARVE-OUT FOR COMMUNITY SOLAR SUBSCRIBER 
ORGANIZATIONS 16–21 (2015), 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/atoms/files/Low-
Income%20Community%20Solar%20Report-CEO.pdf (evaluating Colorado’s 
low-income solar program and identifying several programmatic hurdles). 
 26  See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies & Sanya Carley, Emerging Shadows in 
National Solar Policy? Nevada’s Net Metering Transition in Context, 30 
ELECTRICITY J. 33 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2875878; Ari Peskoe, 
Unjust, Unreasonable, and Unduly Discriminatory: Utility Rates and the 
Campaign Against Rooftop Solar, 11 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 211, 289–96 
(2016) (describing the cost-shifting argument as a distraction and criticizing 
regulatory responses); Benjamin Storrow, Is Nev. Poised to Change Course on 
Net Metering?, CLIMATEWIRE (Nov. 1, 2016), 
http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1060045090/ (discussing Nevada, 
the “poster child” for the debate on net metering); Rule, supra note 22 
(explaining how utility companies claim that net metering is “unfair” and it has 
a potential for “income-regressive” effects, but ultimately contests these  
claims). 
 27 See Thompson, supra note 17, at 282–85 (describing how rate design 
traditional created cross-subsidization between ratepayer classes); Jon 
Wellinghoff & James Tong, Wellinghoff and Tong: A Common Confusion Over 
Net Metering is Undermining Utilities and the Grid: ‘Cost-Shifting’ and ‘Not 
Paying Your Fair Share’ are Not the Same Thing, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 22, 2015), 
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/wellinghoff-and-tong-a-common-confusion-
over-net-metering-is-undermining-u/355388/ (explaining how net metering may 
interfere with the cross-subsidies). But see Peskoe, supra note 26 (stating the 
cost-shifting claims are overblown). 
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reduction, deferred investment in new infrastructure, and ancillary 
services 28 —to all ratepayers, including low-income ones. 29 
Nonetheless, several regulators have imposed restrictions on net 
metering that seem counter-productive.30 Most jurisdictions have 
failed to develop a strategy for ensuring that low-income 
consumers can participate in and benefit from the changing energy 
markets. 
To address these shortcomings, this paper recommends a more 
deliberative approach to providing low-income communities better 
access to the emerging clean energy economy. First, this paper 
recommends that states develop strategies that would apply 
statewide, citywide, or at the utility level to ensure that low-income 
communities are integrated into the energy transition underway. 
Second, once a plan is in place, states should assign specific 
organizations responsibility for providing low-income 
communities resources, services, and access to the clean energy 
economy. Third, to facilitate this access, states should provide 
financial resources for the low-income energy service providers to 
purchase equipment in bulk and install resources in a strategic 
manner that will lower soft costs. Finally, states should also ensure 
sustained funding for programs that will enable low-income 
households to be continuous participants in, and beneficiaries of, 
the ongoing energy transition. 
                                                
 28 “Ancillary services maintain electric reliability and support the transmission 
of electricity.” FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, ENERGY PRIMER: 
A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET BASICS, at 55 (2015), 
https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf. 
 29 Rule, supra note 22, at 137–38 (arguing that net metering and other utility 
policies that promote renewable energy development may mitigate 
disproportionate impacts that low-income communities face due to their 
proximity to polluting energy sources); Davies & Carley, supra note 26, at 5–7 
(explaining how Nevada regulators disregarded a study showing that net 
metering would bring grid-wide benefits and lower costs); Peskoe, supra note 
26, at 277 (discussing multiple benefits). 
 30 Rule, supra note 22, at 138 (stating that reforming net metering on account 
of wealth distribution impacts is generally inefficient and undesirable); Peskoe, 
supra note 26 at 277–98 (arguing that the focus on cross-subsidization is 
misdirected and that policy reforms that stifle distributed solar development, 
such as net metering limitations, undermine competition and necessary reforms 
in the electricity system). 
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Part II of this paper provides a short overview of the current 
state and federal policies and the technological innovations that 
have enabled energy consumers to become electricity service 
providers. Part II also explores ways in which electricity markets 
may continue to evolve and create increasing opportunities for 
electricity prosumers. Part III describes some of the risks that the 
evolving electricity system presents to low-income consumers who 
already face an undue energy and transportation burden. As this 
part describes, some policymakers have recognized these risks and 
pursued progressive policies to provide low-income households 
access to clean energy resources. Other regulators, however, have 
responded to low-income needs by pursuing regressive policies 
that will stifle continued development of a clean energy system. 
Part IV argues for a more comprehensive set of measures that will 
enable low-income households to be part of a more inclusive 
energy transition through planning, designated low-income energy 
providers, and access to affordable clean energy systems. Finally, 
Part V concludes that a more inclusive energy transition is feasible, 
but will require planning and strategy to succeed. 
II. RENEWABLE ENERGY REGULATION, INNOVATION, AND 
THE RISE OF “PROSUMERS” 
For the past several years, the energy system has been in the 
midst of disruption as renewable energy technologies and state and 
federal policies have made a transition away from fossil fuels 
increasingly viable.31 These technologies and policies have also 
altered customers’ relationships with the energy system. 32 
Although utilities continue to supply the vast majority of energy 
services in the United States, a growing number of energy 
consumers today produce energy as well. Multiple factors have led 
to the rise of energy prosumers, including state and federal policies 
that encourage utility customers to generate their own power and 
reduce consumption on demand and technological innovations that 
                                                
 31 See Boyd, supra note 10 (discussing customers’ interests in realizing the 
benefits of disruptive technologies). 
 32 Id. (discussing customers’ interests in realizing the benefits of disruptive 
technologies). 
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have enabled much broader participation in energy markets at 
much lower costs.33 As technologies for energy storage and electric 
vehicles continue to improve and costs come down, it seems likely 
that even more prosumers will seek participation in a dynamic 
energy system.34 This section will highlight the key laws and 
technological innovations that have enabled and will likely 
accelerate changes in energy markets. 
A. Generation 
Electricity generation was once considered the near-exclusive 
domain of large utility providers.35 The central power station model 
embraced by U.S. electricity regulators and utilities allowed a 
small number of utilities to own and operate each component of 
the electricity system—from generation to distribution—through 
vertically integrated monopolies.36 For nearly one hundred years, 
electricity service was a one-way transaction from utilities to 
consumers.37 
The passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
(“PURPA”)38 in 1978, followed by the enactment of the nation’s 
first net metering programs in the early 1980s,39 began to change 
the electricity system. PURPA opened electricity generation to 
                                                
 33 Graffy & Kihm, supra note 11, at 5–6 (discussing declining costs of solar 
and wind power technologies and the proliferation of the state renewable 
portfolio standards); Sharon Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
519, 527, 531–32, 534 (2016) [hereinafter Jacobs, Energy Prosumer] 
(discussing declining costs of solar and storage and policies that support demand 
response and net metering). 
 34 Boyd, supra note 10, at 1699–1701. 
 35 Id. at 1628–29. 
 36 Id. at 1629–30. 
 37 Id. at 1628–30; see Amy Stein, Distributed Reliability, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 
887, 907–09 (2016). 
 38 Pub. L. No. 95–617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645 (2012)). 
 39 See Harvey L. Reiter & William Greene, The Case for Reforming Net 
Metering Compensation: Why Regulators and Courts Should Reject the Public 
Policy and Antitrust Arguments for Preserving the Status Quo, 37 Energy L.J. 
373, 376 (2016) (tracing net metering tariffs to 1980 and stating that the first net 
metering law was passed in 1983). 
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new providers.40 It also allowed cogeneration facilities that were 
customers of the utilities to sell their excess power production to 
the utilities,41 creating the first class of utility “prosumers.” Net 
metering laws expanded the opportunities for prosumers by 
allowing utility customers to pay only for their net energy usage, 
measured by discounting the amount of energy customers 
delivered to the utility from the amount they received.42 Customers 
that were able to produce their own electricity through wind, solar, 
and other designated sources could thereby avoid paying for each 
unit of electricity delivered by the utility to the customers. 43 
Although this incentive did not immediately spur significant 
interest in renewable energy development by utility customers, it 
paved the way for the future prosumer movement. 
In the 2000s, net metering—in combination with federal tax 
credits, state renewable portfolio standards, and state subsidies—
finally spurred a notable uptick in renewable energy production by 
utilities’ customers.44 Since then, rapid technological advances and 
mass production of solar panels have allowed hardware costs for 
solar arrays to drop substantially.45 The combination of lower costs 
and subsidies has also opened solar development to third-party 
solar providers, who rely on net metering to make solar more 
affordable for customers, shared by both the third parties and 
utilities.46 Net metering thus became a critical tool in promoting 
rooftop and distributed solar development.47 Indeed, net metering 
became such an important incentive that the utilities’ trade 
association, the Edison Electric Institute, warned it could lead to a 
utility death spiral if increasing numbers of utility customers 
                                                
 40 Joe Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 
435, 451 (2002). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Rule, supra note 22, at 118. 
 43 See id. 
 44 Sanya Carley, The Era of State Energy Policy Innovation: A Review of 
Policy Instruments, 28 REV. OF POL’Y RES. 265, 273–75 (2011). 
 45 Jacobs, Energy Prosumer, supra note 33, at 527. 
 46 Boyd, supra note 10, at 1677; JASON COUGHLIN ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF 
ENERGY, A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY SOLAR: UTILITY, PRIVATE, AND NON-PROFIT 
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT 3 (2010), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/49930.pdf. 
 47 Rule, supra note 22, at 118. 
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became energy producers.48 While reports of utilities’ deaths may 
be exaggerated, there is little dispute that net metering has stirred 
concerns about the viability of the traditional utility business 
model.49 
B. Demand Response 
As with customer generation of electricity, demand response 
programs date back to at least the 1970s, but have recently become 
more popular for utility customers as new technologies and 
payment structures have developed.50 Demand response programs 
are simple in concept; they either charge electricity customers 
higher rates during peak periods to incentivize load reduction or 
they pay electricity consumers directly to reduce their load upon 
request.51 Demand response programs have grown in size and 
scope, and demand response providers (that is, utilities’ customers) 
may now receive incentive payments in both retail and wholesale 
markets. 52  What’s more, through programs developed by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and regional 
transmission operators, particularly the Pennsylvania, Jersey, 
Maryland Power Pool (“PJM”) Interconnection, demand response 
providers may now bid demand response into separate energy, 
capacity, and ancillary service markets. 53  With the Supreme 
Court’s blessing of wholesale demand response programs,54 and 
increased interest by many utility customers seeking to benefit 
from participating in demand response programs, demand response 
is on the cusp of becoming another major energy service provided 
by utilities’ own customers.55 
                                                
 48 Peter Kind, EDISON ELEC. INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC 
BUSINESS 3–5 (2013), http:// 
www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/Documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf. 
 49 Boyd, supra note 10, at 1677. 
 50 Jacobs, Bypassing Federalism, supra note 14, at 895–900. 
 51 Id. at 897. 
 52 Id. at 897–98. 
 53 Id. at 927. 
 54 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). 
 55 Stein, supra note 37, at 926–30. 
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Technological innovations have opened demand response 
programs to many more participants who can decrease their load 
through small changes in electricity use.56 Historically, only large 
customers had the capacity to implement demand response. 
However, smart energy meters and digital communication systems 
now allow utilities to communicate with an array of electrical 
devices, including residential hot water heaters and air 
conditioners.57 This communication allows utilities to make subtle 
adjustments in the appliances’ operations and related power 
consumption. 58  In exchange for allowing utilities such access, 
utilities’ customers may receive payments for participating in 
demand response.59 On a much larger scale, third-party demand 
response aggregators may now bid into competitive wholesale 
markets to attempt to lower system-wide energy use and market 
clearing prices during peak consumption periods. 60  If the 
aggregated demand response bid clears the market, retail sales of 
power will drop for utilities that would otherwise serve that load. 
While these innovations will help maintain overall grid reliability 
and lower prices, they reduce utilities’ overall sales and could, like 
net metering, have disruptive impacts on the utilities’ business 
model. 
C. Storage and Electric Vehicles 
Although electricity storage and the integration of electric 
vehicles into a dynamic electricity grid are in early stages, 
improved technologies and lower costs make it likely that many 
utility customers will soon be able to sell new grid management 
services to electric utilities. As the costs of storage technologies 
decline, residential ratepayers will be able to provide more 
ancillary services for themselves and the grid.61 Electric vehicles 
                                                
 56 Joel B. Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, “Virtual Power Plants,” and 
the Smart Grid, 7 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J 191, 205–208 (2012). 
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 59 Stein, supra note 37, at 930 (discussing demand response programs for 
swimming pool pumps). 
 60 Jacobs, Bypassing Federalism, supra note 14, at 900; FERC v. Elec. Power 
Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 770 (2016). 
 61 Stein, supra note 37, at 916–26. 
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could help ensure that wind power produced at night can be put to 
good use or stored for use during daylight and peak periods, when 
energy prices are higher. 62  When combined with smart 
communication devices, electric vehicle charging programs could 
enable vehicle owners to charge their batteries when prices are low 
or to even be paid when they take power from the grid during 
“oversupply” periods when generation exceeds load.63 As storage 
and electric vehicle technologies improve, it is only a matter of 
time before enterprising third parties or energy regulators create 
new payment structures that will incentivize utility customers to 
become storage and grid management service providers. 
D. The Multiple Economic Benefits to Clean Energy Market 
Participants 
Utility customers who participate in net metering, demand 
response, or emerging storage and ancillary service programs 
receive several economic benefits. First, and most obviously, they 
receive payments from the utilities (and thus other utility 
customers) whenever they provide the desired electricity service. 
Although direct payments for some services can be relatively low, 
they can amount to meaningful economic benefits when combined 
with subsidies and other compensatory systems. Net metering, for 
example, effectively allows participants to receive some retail 
electricity service for free or at deep discounts.64 Although net 
metering participants must make initial investments in solar arrays 
or batteries, federal and state tax credits offset some of the upfront 
price and provide a shorter payback period for net metering 
customers.65 Demand response operates under a similar design, in 
that participants who enroll in demand response programs may 
have to make initial investments in smart meters, but they then 
                                                
 62 Lamble, supra note 15, at 198–204. But see Stein, supra note 37, at 934 
(noting that vehicle owners may not always be willing to provide grid 
management services if personal vehicle needs outweigh the benefits provided 
by a utility). 
 63 Lamble, supra note 15, at 198–204. 
 64 Scott, supra note 13, at 355. 
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benefit both by paying less for retail power consumption and by 
receiving payments for their negawatts. 66  Storage and electric 
vehicle integration programs will presumably operate similarly. 
Thus, new energy markets create economic incentives for those 
who have the capital to invest in the technology necessary to 
participate in these markets. 
Beyond those direct incentives, participation in clean energy 
programs usually creates attendant benefits, including higher 
property values, local jobs, and improved air quality.67 According 
to the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, rooftop solar increases 
property values.68 Electric vehicle advocates argue that vehicle 
charging stations have a similar economic benefit, at least for 
commercial properties.69 Both solar arrays and electric vehicle 
charging systems are signs of affluence, and they could thereby 
increase values of the specific properties on which they are 
located, as well as neighborhood property values.70 Installation of 
distributed resources could also bring jobs to low-income 
neighborhoods.71 Finally, electric vehicles also provide direct air 
quality benefits by eliminating emissions from vehicles run on 
fossil fuels.72 While the direct air pollution benefits of distributed 
solar depend on whether solar arrays are offsetting localized 
emissions, distributed solar could also improve air quality.73 Since 
participation in clean energy programs requires an initial outlay of 
capital, however, many low-income communities receive none of 
the direct and attendant benefits clean energy programs offer. The 
next section explores this dynamic. 
                                                
 66 Jacobs, Bypassing Federalism, supra note 14, at 887. 
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III. THE RISK OF AN UNJUST ENERGY TRANSITION 
Many low-income electricity customers have few viable 
opportunities to participate in clean electricity markets or to 
otherwise benefit financially from the clean energy transition.74 To 
access the emerging clean energy markets, utility customers must 
have the resources to invest in the metering, storage, renewable 
generation, or demand response technologies that enable utility 
customers to serve as producers.75 Many low-income customers, 
however, lack access to necessary capital or the resources to 
procure, install, and deploy innovative energy technology. 76 
Indeed, many low-income households already face 
disproportionate energy and transportation burdens, 77  and it is 
highly unlikely that they will have access to the resources 
necessary to enable them to build rooftop solar, buy electric 
vehicles, or install smart meters. Without access to capital and 
services that could enable streamlined installation of clean and 
smart energy facilities, low-income customers will continue to be 
left out of the transitioning energy market. 
Recognizing these risks, some regulators have responded to the 
potential disproportionate impacts of the prosumer movement by 
embracing community solar as a tool to increase low-income 
access to renewable resources.78 Other regulators have responded 
to concerns about disproportionate effects by eliminating net 
metering programs or imposing extremely high net metering 
participation charges. 79  Neither approach is adequate. While 
community solar programs allow increased access to clean energy 
                                                
 74 Thompson, supra note 17, at 268. 
 75 Id. at 267–68. 
 76 Id. at 292. 
 77 Id. at 268–70. 
 78  Id. at 290–91; see also Electricity: Green Tariff Shared Renewables 
Program, S.B. 43, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 2833(d)(1)(A)(ii) (Cal. 
2013) (requiring 100 MW of the program’s capacity to be located in 
“disadvantaged communities,” including areas with “socioeconomic 
vulnerability.”). In Colorado, solar developers must allocate at least five percent 
of subscriber shares to low-income participants. Community Solar Gardens Act, 
H.R. 10-1342, 67th Gen. Assemb. (Colo. 2010); 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 723-
3.3665(d)(IV) (2017). 
 79 See Thompson, supra note 17. 
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systems, they are unlikely to provide benefits to large numbers of 
low-income communities. Eliminating clean energy programs in 
the name of low-income communities is a cynical strategy that 
only deprives low-income households of access to clean energy 
benefits. Smarter strategies are necessary to enable low-income 
households to benefit from the current energy transition. 
Otherwise, households and communities with high energy and 
transportation burdens may remain trapped in an electricity system 
that has failed to protect them from energy insecurity or to help lift 
them out of poverty. 
A.  Low-Income Energy and Transportation Burdens 
Low-income communities and households in the United States 
face a higher energy and transportation burden than their middle- 
and upper-income counterparts.80 The terms “energy burden” and 
“transportation burden” refer to the percentages of a household’s 
income spent on energy and transportation.81 As the wealth gap in 
the United States has grown, so has the disproportionate energy 
and transportation burden borne by low-income households.82 
In comparison to middle- and upper-income ratepayers, who 
spend 1-5% of their annual income on household heat and energy, 
low-income ratepayers spend 6-30%.83 According to a 2016 survey 
by the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy 
(“ACEEE”), in metropolitan areas alone, the median low-income 
household’s energy burden was 7.4%, but some cities had low-
income residents with energy burdens as high as 25%. 84  In 
                                                
 80 Id. at 269. 
 81 Id. 
 82  See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES AND 
INCOME: BALANCING FAMILY FINANCES IN TODAY’S ECONOMY (2016), 
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comparison, the median energy burden for higher income 
households was about 2.3%.85 
Low-income households also face disproportionate 
transportation costs.86 In comparison to middle- and upper-income 
households, who spent 11.2% and 8.2%, respectively, on 
transportation in 2014, low-income households spent 15.7%.87 This 
percentage represented a significant increase over prior years, 
when low-income transportation expenditures accounted for 9.5-
10.5% of household income.88 Higher gasoline expenditures are the 
primary cause of the increased transportation burden.89 If gasoline 
prices spike, low-income communities will be particularly hard hit. 
High energy and transportation burdens account for only some 
of the problems facing low-income households. According to The 
Pew Charitable Trusts, low-income households had much less 
financial slack in their budgets in 2014 in comparison to 2004.90 
Indeed, the median low-income household in 2014 had an income 
shortfall of approximately $2,400, indicating that low-income 
households were going into debt to meet basic living expenses.91 
Quite obviously, low-income households have little-to-no 
capacity to make the upfront investments in solar arrays, smart 
meters, or electric vehicles to participate in the growing clean 
energy markets.92 So long as access to capital is a condition of 
participation in these markets, low-income communities will be 
left behind. To address these concerns, regulators have pursued 
various strategies that include curtailing clean energy incentive 
programs for middle- and upper-income ratepayers and expanding 
access to clean energy resources through community solar 
programs.93 As the next two sections indicate, neither approach has 
worked very well. However, more holistic solutions pursued by 
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some states, as described in Part IV, could provide much better 
results. 
B. Death Spirals and Regulatory Overreactions 
Interest in low-income access to clean energy programs has 
increased substantially as participation in net metering has grown. 
Electric utilities and some regulators fear that net metering could 
substantially reduce the revenues utilities collect from higher-
income customers who have the ability to invest in solar arrays and 
other clean energy technology.94 Under traditional electricity rate 
design, wealthier customers typically pay higher rates that are 
designed to subsidize low-income energy assistance programs.95 
Net metering threatens to undo some of this cross-subsidization, 
however, because it incentivizes ratepayers with high rates to 
install solar arrays and offset some amount of their retail electricity 
consumption.96 In places where customers also pay time-of-use 
rates, net metering creates an even greater incentive for them to 
defect from the utility by producing solar power during peak 
periods.97 If enough customers who have the ability to pay for solar 
arrays participate in net metering, utilities fear that costs for non-
participants will have to rise. 98 Higher rates will increase the 
incentives for another wave of customer participation in net 
metering and lead to more price hikes for non-participants.99 If the 
cycle continues, a death spiral could result, in which only low-
income customers are left without an ability to pay for utility 
services. 
Although claims that net metering may erode cross-
subsidization and lead to a death spiral are likely overblown, and 
although net metering caps and price adjustments have already 
minimized the risk of a death spiral caused by net metering, 100 
regulators in some states have used concerns about the 
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 97 Kind, supra note 48, at 4. 
 98 Id. at 5, 13. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Peskoe, supra note 26. 
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disproportionate impacts of net metering on low-income ratepayers 
to justify the evisceration of net metering programs. In Nevada, for 
example, the state public utility commission (“PUC”) effectively 
eliminated net metering by (1) requiring all net metering 
participants to pay a monthly fixed cost that will be approximately 
three times the fixed costs for non-participants and (2) reducing the 
payments net metering customers receive for the electricity they 
sell to utilities by about 80 percent.101 To justify its decision, the 
Nevada PUC relied on utility cost estimates that indicated that net 
metering was creating an unfair subsidy for net metering customers 
at the expense of other ratepayers. 102  The PUC also rejected 
independent analyses that showed that net metering was providing 
grid-wide benefits for all customers. 103  From the PUC’s 
perspective, only a few privileged customers were benefitting from 
net metering at the expense of less-privileged ones.104 To avoid this 
seemingly unfair result, the Nevada PUC effectively eliminated net 
metering in the state. 
While the PUC’s decision may have been motivated by a desire 
to protect low-income ratepayers from price spikes, the PUC never 
considered ways in which a different regulatory or pricing 
structure could provide new benefits to low-income participants. In 
the traditional utility rate design model, low-income customers 
may benefit from reduced rates, but they rarely benefit from 
programs that are designed to provide new opportunities and 
access to new markets. The PUC’s decision reflects this approach. 
Indeed, by eliminating net metering in the state, the decision 
weakened Nevada’s clean energy market and the benefits it could 
provide to ratepayers of all economic levels.105 
C. Community Solar to the Rescue? 
On the other end of the spectrum, low-income and renewable 
energy advocates have sought to expand access to renewable 
                                                
 101 Davies & Carley, supra note 26, at 7–10. 
 102 Id. at 8–9. 
 103 Id. at 5–7. 
 104 Id. at 9–10. 
 105 Id. at 10–13. 
560 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 1 
energy benefits through community solar programs.106 Community 
solar has multiple meanings, but it frequently refers to a program 
in which participants can buy or receive “shares” of an offsite solar 
array in exchange for receiving electricity from that array. 107 
Participants then use the solar power to offset their retail electricity 
consumption through a virtual net metering transaction. Since 
funding for the community solar array comes from multiple 
participants—and is frequently provided or supplemented by 
subsidies, grants, and donations—community solar potentially 
provides opportunities for low-income households to participate in 
and benefit from clean energy development and markets.108 
Community solar may provide several benefits to low-income 
communities, but broad access to the evolving energy markets is 
unlikely to be one of them. Community solar projects may help 
raise neighborhood property values and potentially attract other 
clean energy projects into the neighborhood.109 If these projects 
reduce the use of fossil fuels in the neighborhood, the community 
at large will benefit from improved air quality. However, to the 
extent community solar is seen as a way to provide direct 
economic benefits to low-income households, most community 
solar programs fall short. The majority are not focused on 
providing low-income access to lucrative energy markets, and 
programs with low-income carve-outs face many impediments.110 
Even if programs successfully attract substantial participation from 
low-income households, this will not necessarily yield direct 
financial benefits for these participants; depending on the size of 
the solar array and the number of participants, the division of the 
net metering rights into distinct shares may substantially diminish 
the value of net metering for each individual participant. Thus, 
while community solar may enable some low-income households 
to participate in a limited clean energy program, community solar 
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is not on its own an effective strategy for expanding new energy 
markets to low-income communities. 
And yet, as tepid a program as community solar may be, it 
represents one of the only common strategies aimed at actually 
expanding clean energy markets and benefits to low-income 
communities. Very few programs consider strategies to increase 
low-income access to energy storage, electric vehicles, or demand 
response programs. This is in part because these technologies and 
the markets to support them are just developing. In addition, the 
financial resources necessary to provide low-income access to 
these clean energy systems are significant. Without a plan to 
expand access, however, low-income households will remain 
vulnerable to increasing energy and transportation burdens, even as 
wealthier ratepayers learn how to profit from the clean energy 
transition. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MORE INCLUSIVE ENERGY 
TRANSITION 
Expanding low-income access to a clean energy system will 
require the development of a strategy, designation of low-income 
clean energy providers, bulk purchase and deployment projects, 
and sustained funding for low-income programs. Rather than view 
low-income households as perpetual recipients of lifeline rates, 
state planners and renewable energy advocates should begin to 
envision a future energy system in which low-income households 
are no longer reliant on expensive fuels and cross-subsidization 
through rate design. With the right plan and implementation 
strategy, low-income households can become equal and productive 
participants in a clean energy transition. This section briefly 
sketches out the key steps to developing a more inclusive energy 
transition. 
First, states must develop plans based on the idea that clean and 
advanced energy technologies will displace fossil fuel resources in 
all communities. Until regulators and planners embrace a transition 
to 100% clean energy, they will not have the capacity to envision 
equitable access to clean energy resources. Once they do envision 
an inclusive transition, state regulators must then develop a 
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strategy for prioritizing low-income acquisition of clean energy 
technologies and systems. Much as a state might design its long-
term transportation or land use strategies, an inclusive energy 
transition strategy would establish end goals, identify the strategies 
and tactics to achieve those goals, identify potential obstacles and 
tactics to overcome them, and establish clear, enforceable steps to 
implement the strategy. 
Second, states should establish or designate specific providers 
who will provide low-income households and communities clean 
energy services.111 States may assign this role to existing utilities, 
state agencies, non-profit organizations, or other entities that have 
the skill and capacity to provide specialized services to low-
income communities. Third-party organizations may be best suited 
to this task, as some existing models demonstrate. In California, 
for example, the non-profit organization GRID Alternatives has a 
contract with the state to provide rooftop solar development to 
low-income communities.112 Not only has this model successfully 
increased low-income solar access, it has also lowered 
participants’ monthly electricity bills by approximately 80 
percent.113 In Washington, D.C., city leaders created a separate 
utility, the D.C. Sustainable Energy Utility, to administer an 
Affordable Solar Program and install rooftop solar on homes 
owned by low-income residents.114 In 2012, the program helped 
install nearly ninety rooftop arrays.115 In 2015, the Sustainable 
Energy Utility installed 137 solar arrays on low-income houses, 
accounting for thirty percent of all solar deployment in 
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Washington, D.C. 116  The successes of these third-party 
organizations indicate that low-income households may benefit 
from this third-party model. Alternatively, if states assign existing 
utilities the role of providing clean energy services to low-income 
communities, states should create clear regulatory requirements 
and oversight protocols to ensure that utilities are meeting 
expectations. As the data on energy burdens illustrate,117 the utility 
system has not always served low-income communities effectively, 
and utilities should receive authorization to provide low-income 
clean energy services only if the utilities can deliver. Whichever 
model the state employs, it should make sure that low-income 
providers have adequate training and capacity to deliver clean 
energy services to low-income markets. 
Third, states should finance bulk purchasing and deployment 
projects to reduce equipment and soft costs. 118  Replacing 
traditional energy sources, gasoline-powered vehicles, and 
outdated appliances with the equipment necessary to enable an 
inclusive energy transition will be an expensive endeavor. It will 
also take significant development resources. States can minimize 
these costs through bulk purchasing programs and strategic 
development programs that take advantage of economies of 
scale.119 States should enact laws that require any new homes and 
buildings that receive low-income financial assistance to be built 
with solar arrays, smart meters, and electric vehicle charges 
already in place.120 This will rapidly accelerate low-income access 
to this hardware and reduce installation and permitting expenses 
associated with retrofits. 
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Finally, states should create and support a dedicated low-
income program to provide consistent resources to support an 
inclusive energy transition. Many low-income energy assistance 
programs provide intermittent and inadequate resources.121 Without 
adequate and sustained funding, staffing, and other resources, low-
income households will not have the capacity to participate in the 
energy transition. State planners should therefore develop 
programs that ensure steady access to capital and other necessary 
resources. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The transition to a clean energy system threatens to leave low-
income communities, who already face disproportionate energy 
and transportation burdens, further behind. To avoid this outcome, 
regulators should begin planning for a comprehensive and 
inclusive energy transition. Not only will a strategic approach help 
ensure that low-income communities have priority access to clean 
energy technologies, it will also accelerate the country’s transition 
to carbon-free energy sources. 
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